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I. INTRODUCTION 
Appellants ("Keane") did not disobey or fail to comply with any lawful judgment, order 
or process as required by the rules governing contempt proceedings. There was no judgment 
entered. The Order Confirming Arbitration A wards did not order Keane to pay the arbitration 
awards. It merely granted to Bald, Fat & Ugly ("BFU") the right to obtain a money judgment, 
which BFU failed to obtain. Keane did not disobey the confirmation process because the process 
did not require Keane to payoff the arbitration award. 
Even if the Order Confirming Arbitration Awards was deemed an order to pay the 
arbitration award, it was not be a lawful order. Idaho rules and statutes require the completion of 
three steps in order enforce payment of a sum certain. First, there must be a decision to pay. 
There was a decision in the form of the Order Confirming. There then must be entry of 
judgment. This was never completed. Only upon entry of judgment can a party, with the aid of 
the court, seek enforcement of the obligation to pay. However, the enforcement proceedings do 
not include Contempt Orders. 
There is no substantial or competent evidence that Keane had the then present ability to 
comply with the Contempt Order. The Contempt Order required payment in full of the 
arbitration award of more than $159,000.00 within thirty (30) days. The evidence, in the form of 
the contempt trial transcript, shows that Keane put most of his assets up for sale, sold sufficient 
assets to payoff the other arbitration award in an amount in excess of $282,000.00, did not have 
liquid assets to pay the arbitration award at issue and did not have the ability to pay the 
arbitration award within thirty (30) days absent the sale of additional property. There is no 
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evidence that Keane was able to sell any additional property within the thirty (30) days and he 
explained at the trial the reasons why this might not happen - a weak market and a lack of 
qualified buyers. Keane had no ability to comply with the Contempt Order's command to pay 
the arbitration award in full in thirty (30) days. The Contempt Order should be reversed. 
II. ARGUMENT 
A. Reply to Big. Fat & Ugly's Summary of Argument. 
BFU variously contends that the Appellants ("Keane") were in contempt because they 
refused to honor a mediated settlement agreement, an arbitration award, the district court's Order 
Confirming Arbitration Awards ("Ordering Confirming"), and a "judgment." (Respondent's 
Brief, pp. 3-4.) As BFU itself recognizes, contempt can only be based on a disobedience of a 
court order, process or judgment. Idaho Code § 7-601(5). Neither the settlement agreement nor 
arbitration award involved the court and therefore cannot form the basis for or lead to a finding 
of contempt. 
The Order Confirming is unquestionably a court "order" but there must be disobedience 
of this order. Here, the Order confirmed the arbitration awards but no one claims Keane 
disobeyed confirmation of the awards. (R., p. 44.) Instead, Keane was found in contempt of the 
Order Confirming because he failed to payoff one of the arbitration awards. (R., p. 185.) This 
was not a disobedience of the Order Confirming, however, because that order never ordered 
Keane to pay the arbitration award. It granted to BFU right to obtain a money judgment against 
Keane but does not order Keane to pay anything. The statute cited by the district court in the 
Order Confirming specifically requires that simultaneously with or after confirmation of the 
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award, "judgment or decree shall be entered in conformity therewith and be enforced as any other 
judgment or decree." Idaho Code § 7-914. Therefore, the Order Confirming and the applicable 
statute contemplate entry of judgment after confirmation. There was no entry of judgment. 
An Order granting the right to obtain a money judgment is not an order requiring payment 
of the judgment but, as indicated above, is an order requiring a further step in the process. Read 
carefully, the Order Confirming does not require Keane to do anything. Instead, the Order and 
Idaho Code § 7-914 grants the right to, and therefore requires, BFU to obtain a money judgment 
against Keane before anything is required of Keane. (R., pp. 43-45.) It is BFU that failed to 
comply with the Order Confirming. 
BFU argues that the Order Confirming is also a "judgment" and Keane disobeyed this 
judgment by not paying off the arbitration award. (Respondent's Brief, pp. 3-4.) The Order 
Confirming does not say judgment (or decree) in its title, is not a separate document and has 
attached to it and refers to twenty-six (26) pages of exhibits. (R., pp. 43-45.) As discussed in 
more detail below, the Order Confirming is not a judgment and Keane cannot be held in 
contempt for disobeying a non-existent judgment. 
BFU further summarizes that because Keane is "a very wealthy man" and had "conceded 
he had the ability to pay" and "clearly had the ability to pay" the district court properly found 
Keane in contempt for failing to comply with the Order Confirming. (Respondent's Brief, p. 4.) 
There is no substantial or competent evidence that Keane had the ability to pay the arbitration 
award at all, let alone within the thirty (30) days given by the district court. The evidence shows 
to the contrary. Any wealth Keane had was, and is, tied up in non-liquid assets like real estate, 
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an airplane and an airplane hanger. (Tr., pp. 165-178.) Keane put various of his assets on the 
market for the specific purpose of paying off the arbitration awards. [d. He was partially 
successful and in fact sold enough of his assets to pay $282,734.16 toward one of the arbitration 
awards. [d. 1 Keane was not able, however, despite concerted efforts, to sell any more of his 
assets and was therefore unable to pay toward the other arbitration award. [d. Keane never 
conceded he had the present ability to pay the other arbitration award. [d. Keane consistently 
testified that any ability to pay was tied to his ability to sell his assets, which was in tum tied to a 
poor market and finding qualified and willing buyers. [d. There is not a shred of evidence that 
Keane had any available (liquid) assets to payoff the arbitration award. [d. There is no 
substantial or competent evidence that Keane had the then present ability to pay. 
Keane has never been in disobedience of any court judgment, order or process. Without 
disobedience and without the then present ability to pay, Keane was erroneously found to be in 
contempt and the contempt order should be overturned. 
B. Response to BFU's Claim That the District Court Entered a Money Judgment 
Against Keane. 
Disingenuously, especially given recent case law and mle changes, BFU argues that the 
Order Confirming is a judgment because it resolved the core matter at issue and because the 
word "judgment" can be found in the Order. (Respondent's Brief, p. 6.) This argument is based 
IBFU's attempt to paint Keane as a person who refused to live up to his obligations rings 
hollow in light of the efforts Mr. Keane made to sell his assets to payoff one of the arbitration 
awards and doing so before a judgment was entered. 
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on a selective quotation from Spokane Structure, dicta, and a case (Storey) that has been 
overturned by recent case law and by amendments to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.2 
A judgment is a "separate document" entitled "judgment or decree." I.R.C.P., Rule 54(a). 
The Order Confirming is not entitled, nor does it even have the word, "judgment" or "decree" in 
the title. (R., p. 43.) Nor is it a "separate document." It attaches and refers to twenty-six (26) 
pages of exhibits. (Id. at pp. 43-68.) The Order Confirming is not a judgment. There is no 
judgment with respect to the arbitration awards. 
Aside from the non-existence of a judgment, a judgment must be entered before it can be 
enforced. I.R.C.P., Rule 58(a) states that "upon a decision by the court that a party shall recover 
only a sum certain ... the court shall sign the judgment and the judgment shall be entered by the 
judge or clerk." Id. (Emphasis added.) This rule also requires that a judgment shall be set forth 
on a separate document as required by Rule 54(a). Id. Entry of a judgment is accomplished by 
placing a filing stamp on this separate document. [d. A judgment cannot be enforced until after 
it has been entered. I.R.C.P., Rule 62(a). 
These rules contemplate a three step process for collecting money: (1) a decision by the 
court that a party recover money; (2) the signing and entering of a separate document entitled 
judgment; and (3) enforcement of the judgment. Here, the first step of the process was 
completed. The Order Confirming was a decision by the court that BFU recover money. 
However, the second step has not been completed. There has never been a separate document 
2The rules were amended on July 1, 2010 after both Spokane Structures and Storey were 
decided. 
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entitled judgment entered in this action with respect to the arbitration awards. As a consequence, 
the third step (enforcement of the judgment) could not proceed. Without entry of a money 
judgment there is no legal process for enforcing an award of money. Neither an Order 
Confirming nor Contempt Order can be used to do so. 
Interestingly, BFU's application (motion) for the Order Confirming Arbitration Awards 
requested the first two steps in the process: (1) that the court enter an order confirming the 
arbitration awards; and (2) ralfter confirmation of the arbitration awards, judgment be entered in 
favor of BFU in the following amounts .... (R., p. 15 (emphasis added by BFU - see 
Respondent's Brief, p. 1).) Also of note, the Order Confirming is based on, and refers to, Idaho 
Code § 7-914. (R., p. 44.) This statute also contemplates a two step process: (1) granting an 
order confirming; and (2) entering judgment. Idaho Code § 7-914. It was up to BFU to see that 
this requested second step be completed. It failed to do so. Keane should not be held in 
contempt for BFU' s failure to complete the very process for which Keane was held in contempt 
for not complying. 
BFU's reliance on Spokane Structures is misplaced. (Respondent's Brief, p. 5.) 
Although BFU accurately quotes from that case, BFU fails to note preceding and applicable 
language that the "decision of the court" resolving the underlying lawsuit and the "judgment" 
must be two different documents. Spokane Structures, Inc. v. Equitable Investments, 148 Idaho 
616,621,226 P.3d 1263, 1268 (2010). The Order Confirming was not. 
BFU also relies on Storey Construction, Inc. v. Hanks, 148 Idaho 401,224 P.3d 468 
(2009), for the proposition that this Court in that case confirmed that the title or specific 
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formatting of a document does not control the judgment analysis. (Respondent's Brief, p. 5.) 
BFU argues that it can rely on Storey because it was not specifically mentioned, disavowed or 
criticized by Spokane Structures and therefore had not been overruled. (Respondent's Brief, p. 
5.) Spokane Structures ovemlled any prior case that held that a document combining the 
decision of the court with the relief granted was a judgment. Spokane Structures, 148 Idaho at 
620; 621, 226 P.3d at 1267. BFU relies on Storey for that exact proposition. To the extent that 
Spokane Structures did not overrule Storey, later amendments to the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure did. (See July 1,2010 amendments to LR.C.P., Rules 54(a), et al.) 
Regardless of whether Storey has been overruled by case law or statute, this Court's 
analysis in that case merely assumed, without ruling, that the Order Confirming was also a 
judgment. Storey, 148 Idaho at 410,224 P.3d at 475. Storey therefore has no precedential value. 
In addition, the analysis in Storey was done in the context of res judicata and is dicta, at best, to 
the issues presented in this case. 
Contrary to BFU's position, the district court did not enter a money judgment against 
Keane. Contempt therefore cannot properly be based on disobedience of this non-existent 
judgment. Moreover, because the Order Confirming is not an order to pay and cannot be 
enforced as a judgment, Keane was not in disobedience of this order. 
C. Reply to BFU's Argument that No Judgment was Reguired; Keane was in Contempt 
for Disobeying the Order Confirming and the Confirmation Process. 
BFU contends that whether or not there is a judgment is irrelevant because Keane failed 
to comply with the Order Confirming Arbitration Awards and/or the process "for infusing an 
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arbitration award with judicial authority." (Respondent's Brief, pp. 6-7.) This argument assumes 
that Keane failed to comply with the Order Confirming or the confirmation process. There is no 
evidence that he failed to comply with either. 
Neither the Order Confirming nor the process of confirmation required compliance or 
obedience by Keane. Neither required Keane to pay the awards. If any action was ordered or 
required, it was action by BFU to seek and the court to enter judgment. (R., p. 44.) BFU's 
motion, the arbitration statutes and the Ordering Confirming all contemplate a two step process 
before an order to pay can be enforced. Unless and until that second step (entry of judgment) is 
taken, Keane is not required to obey or comply with the Order Confirming or the confirmation 
process simply because Keane was not ordered to take any affirmative action. 
Nevertheless, BFU argues that the Order Confirming commanded Keane to pay the 
arbitration award and he was found in contempt for violating that order/command. The Order 
confirmed the arbitration awards and granted to BFU the right to recover a money judgment from 
Keane but in no manner ordered Keane to pay the award. That the district court knew how to 
affirmatively and directly order payment, the Contempt Order commands Keane to "pay Award 
#2 in full .. within 30 days." (R., p. 186.) There is no such command in the Order Confirming. 
Nor was the confirmation process disobeyed by Keane. The process requires entry of 
judgment. See Idaho Code § 7-914 (a judgment shall be entered and enforced as any other 
judgment). Keane was not ordered to enter judgment and therefore has not failed to comply with 
the process of confirmation. 
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BFU correctly points out that the disobedience upon which contempt is based must be 
from a "lawful" judgment, order or process. (Respondent's Brief, p. 6.) The lawful process for 
enforcing payment of a sum certain requires entry of judgment. It cannot lawfully be 
accomplished with an Order Confirming Arbitration A wards or a contempt order based on failing 
to pay the sum certain. 
First, the granting of an order confirming an arbitration award requires a judgment in 
conformity therewith and that the judgment be enforced as any other judgment. Idaho Code § 7-
914. The statute does not infuse an Order Confirming with judgment like qualities and in fact 
divests it of any such power by requiring a separate document entitled judgment. No such 
judgment was entered. 
Second, Rule 62( a) allows for enforcement of a judgment only upon the entry of 
judgment. LR.C.P.62(a). Enforcement proceedings cannot proceed without a judgment and by 
parity of reasoning cannot proceed on an Order Confirming. 
Third, execution of or any proceedings to enforce a judgment can be stayed pending the 
disposition of a motion for a new trial or to alter or amend a judgment, or a motion for relief 
from a judgment due to clerical mistakes, or a motion for judgment in accordance with a motion 
for a directed verdict or a motion for amendment to the findings or for additional findings. 
LR.C.P.62(b). A party has the right to file these motions up to fourteen (14) days after entry of 
judgment. LR.C.P. 59(b). Nor can any Rule 60(b) relief be granted for mistake, inadvertence, 
excusable neglect, newly discovered evidence, fraud or other grounds for relief from judgment 
until after there is a final judgment. LR.C.P. 60(b). None of these motions or relief are available 
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to challenge or attempt to correct an Order Confirming Arbitration Awards. Using the Order 
Confirming and subsequent contempt order to enforce payment of a debt precludes from seeking 
any such relief or stay of enforcement because there has been no judgment entered. 
Fourth, the Legislature knows how to expressly give a document other than a judgment 
the force and effect of a judgment. LR.C.P. 74(d) (although entry of judgment is still required, a 
Writ of Mandamus and Writ of Prohibition ordering the party to perform an act or refrain from 
performing an act "shall have the same force and effect as a judgment"). The Legislature has not 
given an Order Confirming Arbitration Awards or an Order on Contempt the same force and 
effect as a judgment and its failure to do so speaks volumes as to the ability of a court to find 
someone in contempt for failing to do that which first requires a judgment or judgment like 
document.3 
Fifth, the enforcement mechanisms for payment of a judgment are manifold. They 
include execution, attachment, garnishment, and liens. But the enforcement of an obligation to 
pay can only come after entry of judgment. LR.C.P.62(a). There can be no enforcement of an 
obligation to pay, whether by execution or contempt powers, without first entering judgment. It 
3BFU argues that the Order Confirming has the same force and effect as a document 
entitled "judgment" for purposes of contempt because Idaho Code § 7-919 makes it an 
appealable order. (Respondent's Brief, p. 8.) It is plain on its face that Idaho Code § 7-919 only 
allows Orders Confirming to be treated like a judgment for purposes of establishing jurisdiction 
for filing an appeal. Idaho Code § 7 -919(b). This statute in no manner converts the Order 
Confirming into a judgment or allows the Order to be enforced like a judgment through contempt 
proceedings or create an exception to all of the mles and statutes requiring entry of judgment 
before enforcing or defending against an obligation to pay. 
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is error to allow the parties and the court to bypass these Legislative based enforcement 
proceedings through the contempt process. 
Sixth, there are numerous other remedies available to a person who owes money against 
the enforcement of that obligation. These include not only the stay on enforcement pending the 
disposition of the motions described above, but also a stay upon filing of bankruptcy (11 U.S.c. 
§ 362(a)(2)) and injunctive relief from enforcement under LR.C.P. 62(f). These remedies against 
enforcement of payment are not available until after entry of judgment (except for bankmptcy) 
and therefore were not available to Keane. 
BFU also claims that the court has inherent powers to enforce orders without the presence 
of a judgment. (Respondent's Brief, pp. 9-10.) Keane agrees. There are innumerable orders that 
are not judgments but can be enforced through contempt proceedings based on the court's 
inherent powers. But, that does not resolve the issue here whether a court has the power to force 
someone to pay money through an Order Confirming without entry of a money judgment. The 
Legislature has created a very specific process for the enforcement of money judgments. Neither 
the parties nor the court should be allowed to circumvent that process under the guise of the 
inherent contempt powers of the court. 
BFU accuses Keane of raising a "red herring" argument by focusing on the lack of a 
judgment. Nevertheless, BFU raises a "straw dog" argument in response to prove that requiring 
a judgment here would lead to the breakdown of the entire judicial process. (Respondent's Brief, 
pp.9-10.) BFU's straw dog is bred from the so-called "logical extension" of Keane's argument 
that a party has no duty to comply with a court order until it is reduced to a judgment. [d. at p. 9. 
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BFU then feeds its straw dog with holdings from two cases upholding contempt orders, neither of 
which were based on an order to pay without ajudgment.4 [d. at pp. 10-11. BFU then asks the 
straw dog to hunt based on the conclusion that not all contempt orders need to be based on a 
judgment, therefore the non-judgment Order Confirming is lawful and a proper basis for 
contempt. [d. 
In typical straw dog fashion, BFU attempts to create an issue that does not exist, direct 
attention to the non-existent issue, show how ludicrous the other party's non-existent position is 
on the non-existent issue, then claim victory on the actual extant issue. Keane is in no manner 
advocating or even arguing that a party can only be in contempt of a judgment. Keane is not 
taking the position that the court's inherent powers of contempt do not include orders, verbal or 
written and other non-judgment documents and actions. Keane agrees that the so-called "logical 
extension" is ludicrous but notes that it is not a logical extension of the actual issues in this case. 
A judgment is required in this case because that is the lawful process for enforcing an obligation 
to pay, not an Order Confirming. 
Incongmously, BFU then argues that the contempt was not based on failing to pay a 
money. (Respondent's Brief, p. 11.) BFU now appears to argue that the obligation at issue 
would not be reduced to a money judgment but was instead more of a directive to pay funds to a 
tmst account as a type of performance bond to ensure certain work was completed. Id. What 
4These cases upheld contempt orders based on a failure to comply with an order to 
execute a settlement agreement and a failure to comply with a TRO. Absent from Respondent's 
Brief is a citation to any case upholding a contempt order based on an alleged order to pay 
without entry of a judgment. 
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BFU describes is simply to whom the money is to be paid and the purpose for which the money 
would be used, neither of which would change the nature of the judgment should it ever be 
entered. BFU was awarded the right to recover a sum certain, the result of which would be a 
money judgment. 
The incongmity of the argument is best showcased in the very Order of which the court 
found Keane to be in contempt. The Order Confirming expressly gave BFU the right to recover a 
"money judgment". (R., p. 44.) Indeed, the arbitrator clarified that the arbitration award is in the 
nature of a monetary award and did not order Keane to do anything but pay. (R., p. 68.) The 
district court acknowledged this when he quoted the arbitrator as follows: "I did not order or 
direct that Keane perform (or even be allowed to perform) the work in question .... " (R., p. 
184.) BFU cannot now reasonably argue that the obligation to pay would be reduced to 
something other than a money judgment. 
No judgment has been entered in this matter. Neither the Order Confirming nor the 
process for confirming the arbitration awards required payment of those awards. Even if they 
did, it would not be a lawful order or process to pay. One can only be forced to pay money after 
entry of judgment and only through the enforcement mechanisms afforded by the mles and 
statutes (of which contempt is not one). To allow contempt proceedings to be used as a debt 
collection tool without first requiring a judgment would deprive Keane of numerous remedies 
and defenses that cannot be invoked until after entry of judgment. Whether this would rise to the 
level of a deprivation of due process rights need not be determined at this stage. It merely shows 
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that an order to pay money without a judgment is not a lawful order upon which contempt can be 
based. 
Keane did not ignore, fail to comply with or disobey the Order Confirming. The order 
did not require him to do anything. It needed further action by others before any action could be 
taken - the required entry of judgment. That never came. There is nothing contemptuous about 
waiting for the obligation to pay to ripen into a valid judgment. 
Interestingly, even if the judgment had been entered and Keane still did not pay there 
would be no grounds for contempt. Instead, BFU, with the aid of the court, could seek writs of 
execution, garnishment, attachment or file liens on the very property BFU claims made Keane a 
"very wealthy man." Upon execution, for instance, the sheriff could seize Keane's assets and 
force the sale of any non-exempt property. Again, interestingly, if the sheriff was no more able 
to sell the property than Keane was there would still be no grounds for contempt. The mere 
failure to pay a debt is not grounds for contempt. 
If the proper collection process were followed, then Keane would have had the 
opportunity to file motions to challenge the judgment or get automatic stays that would extend 
the mere thirty (30) days allowed by the contempt order or seek a stay of execution or 
contemplate bankruptcy or simply allow the enforcement of the judgment process to be 
completed. Taking anyone of these actions would not be grounds for contempt. How then could 
Keane be found in contempt for violating an order that does not require actual payment or, even 
if it did, required him to pay before judgment had been entered? 
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D. Reply to BFU's Argument That Keane was in Contempt Based on Substantial and 
Competent Evidence. 
For the Contempt Order to stand there must be, at a minimum, substantial and competent 
evidence: (1) that Keane was ordered to make payment; or (2) there was a money judgment; and 
(3) that Keane had the then present ability to pay the entire arbitration award ($159,000.00 + 
prejudgment interest) within thirty (30) days. There is no such order to pay, no judgment and the 
only substantial and competent evidence regarding Keane's ability to pay is that he did not have 
the present ability to pay. 
1. Reply to BFU's Claims That Keane Disobeyed the Order Confirming 
Arbitration Awards. 
BFU describes Keane's disobedience to the Order Confirming as follows: 
1. Keane failed to undertake serious efforts to liquidate his sizeable assets; 
2. Keane failed to make the required payments; 
3. Keane sought to circumvent the Order Confirming by performing the work 
himself; and 
4. Keane failed to take more urgent efforts to sell his property and pay within 
thirty (30) days as he promised. 
(Respondent's Brief, pp. 14-15.) 
Keane was not found to be in contempt for the alleged disobedience numbers 1, 3 and 4 
above. Nor could the court have found Keane to be in contempt for disobedience numbers 1, 3 
and 4. The Order Confirming in no manner ordered, adjudged or decreed that Keane liquidate 
his "sizeable" assets, or to sell his property within thirty (30) days. (R., pp. 43-45.) Nor did the 
Order Confirming order Keane to refrain from performing certain work. [d. He was found to be 
in contempt for not having paid an arbitration award. (R., p. 185.) Regardless, whether there 
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was substantial or competent evidence that Keane disobeyed the Order Confirming as described 
in 1,3 or 4, is irrelevant.5 
The only relevant alleged "disobedience" is Keane's alleged failure to payoff the 
arbitration award. There is no "clear personal directive to pay funds" in the Order Confirming as 
claimed by BFU. It confirms the arbitration awards. These awards are not directives to pay. 
Even if they were they are not court directives. 
Nor did the district court order payment of the awards by confirming them. It is true the 
Order Confirming uses boiler plate language "IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND 
DECREED" but it did not order, adjudge or decree that Keane payoff the arbitration awards. 
(R., p. 44.) It ordered, adjudged and decreed that BFU "have and recover from" Keane "a money 
judgment." [d. This is not a clear personal directive to Keane to pay the arbitration awards. It is, 
at best, a clear personal directive to BFU to obtain a money judgment and have it entered. BFU 
never did. In no manner can BFU's failure be deemed a disobedience by Keane. 
There is no substantial (or any) evidence that Keane disobeyed any lawful judgment, 
order or process of the court requiring him to pay the arbitration awards. 
51t should be noted, however, that there is no such evidence. The evidence shows Keane 
made serious efforts to liquidate his assets and with some success. (Tr., Contempt Trial, pp. 165-
178.) The evidence shows he put many of his assets on the market and by doing so was able to 
pay over $282,000.00 toward one of the arbitration awards. [d. 
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2. Reply to BFU's Claims Regarding Keane's Knowledge of the Confirmation 
Order. 
There is no dispute that Keane knew of the arbitration, the arbitration awards, the 
clarification of the arbitration awards and the Order Confirming Arbitration A wards. That is not 
the relevant issue. A contemnor must have more than knowledge of an order, the order must 
clearly state what he has been ordered to do. Here, there is no substantial or competent evidence 
that Keane knew from the Order Confirming that he had been ordered to pay the arbitration 
awards. The evidence is to the contrary. The Order Confirming does not clearly (or at all) order 
Keane to pay the arbitration awards. His knowledge of his duty to pay cannot have come from 
this order. Moreover, the rules and statutes do not allow for the enforcement of an obligation to 
pay without entry of a judgment. Keane's lack of notice and therefore lack of knowledge of any 
court commandment to pay the arbitration award is fatal to the Contempt Order. 
3. Reply to BFU's Contention That There is Substantial and Competent 
Evidence that Keane had the Present Ability to Comply With Portions of the 
Order Confirming. 
The substantial and competent evidence relied upon by BFU to show that Keane had the 
present ability to comply is the transcript from the proceedings on contempt dated September 9, 
2011. Specifically, BFU cites to pages 166-174 of the transcript. This evidence, however, does 
not support BFU's claims that Keane failed to undertake serious efforts to liquidate his assets or 
that he conceded that he had the present ability to pay. Instead, this evidence supports his serious 
efforts to sell real property, an airplane and an airplane hanger with values of nearly 
$2,000,000.00. (Tr., Contempt Trial, pp. 166-172.) The evidence also describes the reasons why 
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more of these items had not sold, including a weak market and various buyers' inability to secure 
financing. [d. 
Moreover, the allegation that Keane has failed to liquidate his assets is contradicted by his 
payment of over $282,000.00 toward the arbitration awards received from the sale of assets. (Tr., 
Contempt Trial, pp. 165-178.) The alleged substantial and competent evidence that Keane 
conceded his ability to pay reads as follows: 
Q: If the Court were to order you today to come up with that $159,000, how 
long would it take you to make that money? 
A: Depends on the sale of one of these properties. 
Q: You can do it though, couldn't you? 
A: With cash today, no. Depends on the sale of the property. 
Q: Would you be willing if the Judge told you to do it in 30 days, would you 
be willing to list all your properties for sale to raise that money? 
A: I would be willing to do what it takes to get solitude. 
Q: Would you do what it takes to obey the Court's order to pay the money? 
A: Yes. 
Q: You have the ability to do that, don't you, if you choose to? 
A: If a property sold. 
(Tr., pp. 175-176.) Rather than conceding that he had the ability to pay, Keane clearly testified 
that he had no liquid assets with which to pay at that time and any ability to pay depended upon 
the sale of property. [d. There is no substantial or competent evidence that Keane had the then 
present ability to comply with any commandment to pay the arbitration award. 
E. Reply to BFU's Contention that Requiring Payment Within Thirty (30) Days is an 
Appropriate Sanction. 
The district court, in its contempt order, required payment of the arbitration award in full 
within thirty (30) days of the signing of the order. (R., p. 186.) BFU argues that this sanction 
was not an abuse of discretion because Keane admitted he could comply "if he wanted to badly 
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enough" and Keane failed to offer any explanation as to why he failed to list or sell property "at a 
low enough price to ensure prompt sale." (Respondent's Brief, pp. 16-17.) Keane did not admit 
that he could payoff the arbitration award within thirty (30) days. Rather, he testified that if the 
court were to order him to pay the entire $159,000.00, the length of time it would take him to pay 
that money would depend upon the length of time it took to sell one of the many listed properties. 
(Tr., p. 175,1. 25-p. 176,1. 7.) There is no evidence that he was able to do so within those thirty 
(30) days. When asked if the judge required him to make that payment within thirty (30) days, 
whether he was willing to list all his properties for sale to raise the money, (ld. at p. 176,11. 8-
18.) he responded he would be willing to do what it takes "to get solitude" and to obey the 
court's order to pay money but only if additional property was sold. /d. 
As to Keane's alleged lack of explanation as to why he did not list or sell the property at a 
low enough price to insure prompt sale, the "evidence" cited in no manner stands for that 
proposition. BFU cites to the transcript on the contempt trial, p. 140,11. 1-16. (Respondent's 
Brief, p. 17.) Keane's testimony was that he would be willing to reduce the price to fire sale 
status if somebody made him an offer. [d. His precise testimony, cited to by BFU, is: 
Q: How much of that is up for sale? 
A: For the right price I'll sell anything. 
Q: You are trying to raise money though? 
A: That's correct. 
Q: SO why not sell it at a fire sale where you can get it gone in 30 days, is 
there a reason you don't do that? 
A: No. 
Q: If you sold - if you reduced the price on lot 4 from seventy-four nine down 
to twenty-five, I bet you could sell it? 
A: Yeah. 
Q: SO why not? 
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A: I don't know. I would probably if somebody came and made me an offer 
just to get my solitude. Would you like to buy it? 
Id. In addition, Keane gave very detailed explanations why he was unable to sell more property-
a weak market and lack of qualified buyers. Id. 
In addition to there being no evidentiary basis for the sanction of full payment within 
thirty (30) days, it was an abuse of discretion to require full payment within thirty (30) days given 
his then present inability to comply as discussed above. When the evidence indicates that he 
could not comply at all, requiring him to comply within thirty (30) days was an abuse of 
discretion. 
This sanction was a further abuse of discretion because it ordered payment of a debt 
without entry of judgment, without requiring BFU to exhaust other enforcement mechanisms 
(i.e., execution, attachment, garnishment or lien) and by depriving Keane of available remedies 
and defenses to payment that do not exist in response to a contempt order but would exist if a 
judgment had been entered. The sanction ordered was an abuse of discretion. 
F. Reply to BFU's Claim that the Order Striking Keane's Affirmative Defenses Was 
Appropriate. 
BFU argues that the district court did not abuse its discretion in striking Keane's 
affirmative defenses as untimely because the court did not grant an extension of time or mislead 
Keane regarding the timeline for filing. (Respondent's Brief, p. 17.) Keane does not argue that 
the court misled his counsel and agrees that he has the duty to know the rules. Therefore, the 
district court's intent is irrelevant. The district court abused its discretion in not taking into 
account or making a finding as to the reasonableness of Keane's counsel's understanding that 
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Keane had been granted an extension consistent with the fourteen (14) days discussed at the 
hearing. 
The issue, one never decided by the district court, is whether it was reasonable for 
counsel to believe he had been granted fourteen (14) days to respond with affirmative defenses. 
Certainly, it was reasonable given the use of the word "yes" in response to the statement that 
affirmative defenses were due in fourteen (14) days. (Tr., pp. 8-9.) Additional evidence of 
reasonableness is the strict compliance with the fourteen (14) day deadline. In other words, 
Keane asserted his affirmative defenses within the fourteen (14) day period indicating his 
understanding of the due date. (R., pp. 152-156.) Also, because the rule expressly allows for 
extensions oftime, it was reasonable for Keane's counsel to believe that the court had granted 
that extension. See LR.C.P., Rule 75(g)(2). 
BFU claims that even if the district court abused its discretion, any error was harmless. 
(Respondent's Brief, p. 18.) One of the affirmative defenses struck by the district court was 
Keane's inability to comply with the Order Confirming and that among the reasons he was 
unable to comply were the actions of counsel and BFU that specifically prevented Keane from 
complying. (R., p. 153.) It is clear from the district court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law that it did not take this affirmative defense into account in determining Keane's ability to 
pay. (ld. at p. 185.) Had the district court considered this affirmative defense it had the direct 
bearing on Keane's ability to comply and if it had ruled based on that affirmative defense that 
there was no ability to comply, the contempt order would not have been issued. This cannot be 
said to be harmless error. 
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G. BFU's Additional Issues on Appeal. 
1. Response to BFU's Claim that Lack of an Enforceable Judgment Cannot Be 
Considered. 
BFU argues that, as an issue raised for the first time on appeal, whether there was entry of 
judgment should not be considered. The judge is tasked with the responsibility for ensuring that 
a proper judgment has been entered. See Ward v. Lupinacci, 111 Idaho 40, 720 P.2d 223, (Ct. 
App. 1986). BFU was granted the right to seek a judgment in the Order Confirming but did not. 
(R., p. 44.) It is the very failure of the district court and BFU to properly complete the process 
for enforcing payment of the arbitration award that makes the contempt order erroneous. BFU 
now, once again, seeks to use the lack of a properly entered judgment as a means for keeping the 
contempt order in effect. This is unquestionable. Besides, there are other reasons for 
overturning the contempt order, including, but not limited to, the lack of substantial or competent 
evidence that Keane had the then present ability to comply. Nevertheless, this Court should 
consider the impact that no entry of judgment has upon the validity of the contempt order. 
The overarching "issue" presented to the district court, and now on appeal, is whether 
Keane was in contempt for failing to comply with the Order Confirming. Entry of judgment is 
not a new issue raised for the first time on appeal, but is rather a legal defense to the overarching 
issue. State of Idaho v. Bower, 135 Idaho 554, 557, 21 P.3d 491,494 (Ct. App. 2001). An 
appellate court may exercise its discretion to consider a point for the first time on appeal where 
the point involves a pure question of law determinable from uncontroverted facts. Ochoa v. State 
of Idaho, Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, 118 Idaho 71, 78, 794 P.2d 1127, 1134 (1990). 
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Here, there are no disputed facts on this point. There was no entry of judgment. The issues 
raised by the lack of entry of judgment are purely questions of law. Therefore, to the extent it is 
found that these are points raised for the first time on appeal, this Court can still consider them. 
See, [d. 
2. Reply to BFU's Request for Attorney Fees and Costs on Appeal. 
Both parties agree that the award of attorney fees on appeal is governed by Idaho Code § 
12-120(3). Consequently, the only issue to be decided is whether there is a prevailing party and, 
if so, which party prevailed. To the extent that Keane is determined to be the prevailing party, 
BFU is not entitled to attorney fees. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Keane respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's order and judgment 
finding him in contempt, reverse the award of attorney fees to BFU by the district court, and 
award attorney fees on appeal to Keane. 
DATED this ~ day of September, 2012. 
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. 
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